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ABSTRACT
It  is  well  known  that  unemployment  benefits  raise  unemployment  durations.  This  result  has
traditionally been interpreted as a substitution effect caused by a distortion in the price of leisure
relative to consumption, leading to moral hazard. This paper questions this interpretation by showing
that unemployment benefits can also affect durations through an income effect for agents with
limited liquidity. The empirical relevance of liquidity constraints and income effects is evaluated in
two ways. First, I divide households into groups that are likely to be constrained and unconstrained
based on proxies such as asset holdings. I find that increases in unemployment benefits have small
effects on durations in the unconstrained groups but large effects in the constrained groups. Second,
I find that lump-sum severance payments granted at the time of job loss significantly increase
durations among constrained households. These results suggest that unemployment benefits raise
durations primarily because of an income effect induced by liquidity constraints rather than moral
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One of the classic empirical results in public ﬁnance is that social insurance programs such as
unemployment insurance (UI) reduce labor supply. For example, Moﬃtt (1985), Meyer (1990),
and others have shown that a 10% increase in unemployment beneﬁts raises average unemployment
durations by 4-8% in the U.S.1 This ﬁnding has traditionally been interpreted as evidence of moral
hazard caused by a substitution eﬀect: UI distorts the relative price of leisure and consumption,
reducing the incentive to work. In their handbook chapter on social insurance, Krueger and Meyer
(2002) remark that behavioral responses to UI and other social insurance programs are large because
they “lead to short-run variation in wages with mostly a substitution eﬀect.” Similarly, Gruber
(2005) notes that “UI has a signiﬁcant moral hazard cost in terms of subsidizing unproductive
leisure.”
This paper questions the substitution eﬀect and moral hazard interpretation of the link between
unemployment beneﬁts and durations. The analysis is motivated by recent studies which give
strong evidence that many unemployed individuals face liquidity constraints. Gruber (1997) ﬁnds
that increases in UI beneﬁts reduce the consumption drop during unemployment, indicating that
agents are unable to smooth consumption relative to permanent income. Browning and Crossley
(2001) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) provide more direct evidence for the liquidity constraint
mechanism by showing that the UI-consumption link identiﬁed by Gruber holds only for the subset
of individuals who report holding few assets at the time of job loss. Nearly half of job losers in
the United States report zero liquid wealth at the time of job loss, suggesting that liquidity is a
concern for many of the unemployed.
I show how liquidity constraints aﬀect the UI-duration link using a stylized model in which
unemployed agents make search decisions and face a constraint on the amount of debt they can
hold. I ﬁrst establish that UI has negligible wealth eﬀects for agents who are able to smooth
consumption during unemployment spells, since UI beneﬁts do not change permanent income very
much.2 Hence, for unconstrained individuals, UI has essentially a pure substitution eﬀect, consis-
1See Atkinson and Micklewright (1990) and Krueger and Meyer (2002) for comprehensive reviews of this literature.
2For frequent job losers, the wealth eﬀects of UI may be non-trivial even without liquidity constraints. This issue
is addressed in greater detail in section 2.
1tent with the traditional interpretation of the empirical evidence. However, for agents who face
liquidity constraints, behavior while unemployed is determined by cash on hand rather than lifetime
resources. UI beneﬁts provide liquidity and raise consumption while unemployed. As a result,
agents face less pressure to ﬁnd a new job quickly, and may choose to lengthen their unemployment
duration by raising their reservation wage or lowering search eﬀort. Hence, for agents with limited
liquidity, UI beneﬁts can raise durations for a second reason: an income eﬀect that occurs because
agents have more cash on hand while unemployed.3 This income eﬀect occurs independently of
and in addition to the conventional substitution eﬀect.
The distinction between the income and substitution eﬀect is of interest because the two eﬀects
lead to divergent views about behavioral responses to insurance. The substitution eﬀect is a socially
suboptimal response to the creation of a wedge between private and social marginal costs. The
lengthening of unemployment durations by the substitution eﬀect — sometimes labelled “gaming
the system” — creates a moral hazard cost of providing insurance. In contrast, the income eﬀect is
a socially optimal response to the correction of a market failure (insuﬃcient liquidity). An increase
in durations is thus less desirable from a normative perspective if it arises from a substitution eﬀect
(see section 5 for details). Therefore, estimating the magnitude of the substitution eﬀect is a key
step in assessing the relevance of moral hazard in UI as well as other insurance programs.
I use two complementary empirical strategies to investigate the importance of income vs. substi-
tution eﬀects in UI. The ﬁrst method provides estimates of the eﬀect of UI on durations separately
for liquidity-constrained and unconstrained households. This heterogeneity analysis is helpful in
determining the plausibility of income eﬀects. For example, if UI beneﬁts were to aﬀect dura-
tions only among unconstrained households, income eﬀects could not be very large. But if the
UI-duration link were driven primarily by constrained households, income eﬀects generated by
liquidity constraints could be relevant.
An obvious diﬃculty in implementing the heterogeneity analysis is that one cannot directly
observe which households face liquidity constraints in the data. To overcome this latent variable
3The term “income eﬀect” is used somewhat diﬀerently in this paper than in typical models where there are no
liquidity constraints. To clarify, I use the term “income eﬀect” to describe the eﬀect of having additional income
(i.e., additional liquidity) while unemployed. This diﬀers from the eﬀect of raising lifetime wealth, which I refer to
as a “wealth eﬀect.”
2problem, I use several proxies that have been shown to predict constraints in studies of consumption
(e.g. Zeldes 1989, Browning and Crossley 2001). The ﬁrst proxy is the household’s liquid asset
holdings net of unsecured debt (or assets relative to earnings) prior to job loss. Households with
higher levels of assets are less likely to become constrained than those who have a smaller buﬀer
stock. The second proxy is whether the individual had a working spouse prior to job loss. Dual-
earner households are more likely to have the resources and credit access necessary to smooth
consumption when one of them loses a job. The third proxy is whether the individual was making
a mortgage payment before losing his job, which is a rigid commitment that eﬀectively reduces
liquid wealth.
Ie x a m i n et h ee ﬀect of UI beneﬁts on unemployment exit hazards in each of the constrained
and unconstrained groups using nonparametric graphical methods and Cox hazard models. Visual
analysis, non-parametric tests, and hazard model estimates uniformly indicate that a 10% increase
in UI beneﬁts raises unemployment durations by 6-8% in all the constrained groups, but has little
or no eﬀect on durations in the unconstrained groups. These results are robust to the inclusion
of rich controls and other speciﬁcation checks such as the permission of unobserved heterogeneity
in baseline hazards. In addition, there is no association between UI beneﬁts and durations in a
“control group” of UI-ineligible and non-claiming individuals, supporting the exogeneity of the UI
beneﬁtr a t e s .
These results show that the link between unemployment beneﬁts and durations documented
in prior studies is driven by a subset of the population that is likely to be liquidity constrained.
This point requires careful interpretation. Barring additional assumptions, the evidence does not
establish that liquidity constraints cause larger responses to UI beneﬁts. It simply shows that UI
beneﬁts have diﬀerent eﬀects in constrained and unconstrained groups. Whether these diﬀerences
arise because of the constraints themselves or because of correlation between preferences and asset
holdings, which are endogenous to preferences, is unclear. What is clear — and most relevant for
the main point of this paper — is that the substitution eﬀect for the unconstrained group is small,
while the total beneﬁt elasticity of durations in the constrained group is large. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the hypothesis that an income eﬀect is involved in the UI-duration link, but do not
establish the existence of an income eﬀect by themselves (unless one assumes that the substitution
3elasticities are similar across constrained and unconstrained groups).
This observation motivates the second portion of the empirical analysis, in which I explicitly
decompose the beneﬁt elasticity of unemployment durations into an income and substitution eﬀect
using variation in lump-sum severance payments. To do so, I use a new dataset that matches
survey data collected by Mathematica with administrative records on unemployment durations.
Non-parametric analysis shows that individuals who received a lump-sum severance payment at
the time of job loss (worth about $2000 on average) have substantially lower unemployment exit
hazards, suggesting that income eﬀects are indeed large. An obvious concern is that this ﬁnding
may reﬂect correlation rather than causality because severance pay is not randomly allocated.
Two pieces of evidence support the causality of severance pay. First, the estimated eﬀect of
severance pay is virtually unchanged with the inclusion of a large set of controls for demographics,
income, job tenure, industry, and occupation in a Cox model. Second, severance payments have
a large positive eﬀect on durations among constrained (low asset) households, but have no eﬀect
on durations among unconstrained households, consistent with the model’s predictions. Since
there is no a priori reason to expect a diﬀerential eﬀect of severance pay by asset holdings under
the most plausible omitted-variable hypotheses, this evidence supports the claim that lump-sum
income grants lengthen unemployment durations.
Combining the point estimates from the two empirical approaches, a simple calculation indicates
that roughly 70% of the UI-duration link is caused by an income eﬀect.4 Hence, the liquidity eﬀect
identiﬁed here appears to be more important than the marginal incentive distortions typically
emphasized as an explanation of why unemployment beneﬁts lengthen unemployment durations.
This ﬁnding for UI raises the possibility that moral hazard is less prevalent in other types of private
and social insurance than suggested by the existing literature as well.
I would like to emphasize two limitations of this paper before proceeding. First, a full welfare
analysis of UI would require a complete model of job separations and ﬁnding with endogenous
determination of saving behavior based on unemployment beneﬁts. This analysis is outside the
4The non-zero estimate of the substitution eﬀect is consistent with the spike in the hazard rate around beneﬁt
exhaustion (Katz and Meyer 1990). This spike could partially be generated by an income eﬀect as agents anticipate
losing beneﬁts, but its magnitude does suggest some intertemporal substitution.
4scope of this paper. My goal here is simply to identify the key empirical patterns that should
i n f o r ms u c haw e l f a r ea n a l y s i s ,u s i n gas t y l i z e dm o del that makes the main intuition transparent.
A second limitation is that the empirical analysis in this paper is not based on randomization,
and thus one may have concerns about omitted variable biases in interpreting some aspects of the
evidence. In defense of the results, most alternative explanations would not simultaneously explain
all the patterns observed in the two datasets. For example, though constrained households might
be more responsive to UI beneﬁts because of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, the ﬁnding
that both severance pay and UI beneﬁts aﬀect the behavior of only these households still implies an
income eﬀect. Nonetheless, a study that uses randomized variation in lump sum grants is needed
to obtain the most compelling and precise estimates of income eﬀects. In view of these limitations,
this paper should be viewed as a ﬁrst step that calls for more research on disentangling income and
substitution eﬀects to better understand the relevance of moral hazard in insurance provision.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section formalizes the two potential
behavioral responses to UI in a lifecycle model with borrowing constraints. Section 3 describes the
estimation strategy, data, and results for the borrowing constraint and heterogeneity tests. Section
4 examines the eﬀect of severance payments on durations. Section 5 discusses some normative
implications of the results, and section 6 concludes.
2T h e o r y
Ia n a l y z et h ee ﬀects of borrowing constraints and UI beneﬁts in a stylized model similar to that
used by Zeldes (1989) to analyze the eﬀect of borrowing constraints on consumption dynamics.
The only diﬀerences are that the model below ignores portfolio choice but introduces endogenous
labor supply to study unemployment durations.
Let cs denote consumption at time s and e w denote the agent’s wage, which is constant over
time. Normalize the interest and discount rates at zero. Assume that the agent lives for T years
(in continuous time) and loses his job at time t<T.
I make several assumptions to simplify the analysis, and discuss later why relaxing them does not
change the main results. First, I model the borrowing constraint by assuming that the agent must
5always maintain positive wealth. Second, I assume that agents can control their unemployment
duration (d) deterministically by varying search eﬀort, as in Moﬃtt and Nicholson (1982). Search
costs, the leisure value of unemployment, and the beneﬁts of additional search via improved job
matches are all captured in a reduced-form manner by a concave, increasing function ϕ(d).T h i r d ,
I assume that the agent never loses his job again after he ﬁnds a new job, and supplies one unit of
labor permanently after that point.
The agent receives an unemployment beneﬁto fb while he is not working. The government
ﬁnances the beneﬁts by taxing the worker at a rate τ while employed, so his net-of-tax wage is
w = e w(1 − τ). To focus on the duration margin, assume that the probability of job loss does not
vary with b.
Assuming the Inada condition uc(c =0 )=∞, the technological constraints cs ≥ 0 will never










As ≥ 0∀s ∈ [t,T)
where As denotes asset holdings at time s.
Since there is no uncertainty or discounting, and no income growth both when unemployed
and employed, the optimal consumption path is ﬂat in both states. Let cu denote consumption
while unemployed and ce consumption while employed. Note that the only time the borrowing
constraint could possibly bind is at the end of the unemployment spell. The agent’s problem can
therefore be rewritten as
maxdu(cu)+( T − d)u(ce)+ψ(d)
s.t. [λ] AT = At + bd + w(T − d) − dcu − (T − d)ce =0 (1)
[µ] Ad = At + bd − dcu ≥ 0 (2)
6Let λ denote the multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget constraint (1) and µ the
multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint (2). These multipliers represent the marginal
value of relaxing each of the constraints at the optimum. Let ∆u = u(ce)−u(cu) denote the change
in the ﬂow utility of consumption from the unemployed to the employed period. The ﬁrst order
conditions for the agent’s maximization problem are:
u0(cu)=λ + µ (3)
u0(ce)=λ (4)
ϕ0(d)=( λ + µ)(w − b)+( λ + µ)(cu − ce)+∆u (5)
The intuition for these optimality conditions can be seen with standard perturbation arguments.
First consider the case where (2) does not bind. If the borrowing constraint is slack at the optimum,
there cannot be any marginal value in loosening it further. Hence, µ =0and u0(cu)=λ =
u0(ce). In this case, the optimality condition for the duration choice simpliﬁes to ϕ0(d)=λ(w −b).
Intuitively, the marginal beneﬁt of remaining unemployed one week longer should oﬀset the marginal
consumption utility loss of losing w − b in income.
Now consider the case where the borrowing constraint (2) binds. Now the provision of an
extra dollar of wealth at time t relaxes both the borrowing constraint and the intertemporal budget
constraint, raising utility by λ+µ. Since it is strictly optimal to consume that dollar immediately
if the borrowing constraint is binding, the marginal utility of consumption while unemployed must
equal the sum of these two multipliers. But additional wealth when employed does not relax the
borrowing constraint, so u0(ce)=λ. When the agent is constrained, the optimality condition for
duration has additional terms because the agent exhausts his assets before ﬁnding a new job and
thus consumption is not smooth over time: cu <c e = w.
Let g(·) denote the inverse of the ψ0(d) function and deﬁne Z =( λ + µ)(w − b)+( λ + µ)(cu −
ce)+∆u. Then the agent’s unemployment duration can be written as
d = g(Z) (6)
7This equation is very similar to the Frisch labor supply expression obtained from intertemporal
labor supply models (MaCurdy 1981; Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).5 It diﬀers from the standard
Frisch expression only because of the borrowing constraint. In the unconstrained case, where
Z = λ(w−b), the agent’s unemployment duration (or, equivalently, labor supply) is fully determined
by the marginal utility of wealth, λ, and the net wage, w − b.A s s h o w n b y M a C u r d y , t h i s
representation for the optimal labor supply decision permits a transparent separation of wealth
and substitution eﬀects, because wealth eﬀects aﬀect behavior only by changing λ.I n o w u s e
this observation to compute the wealth and income eﬀects of UI beneﬁts for unconstrained and
constrained individuals.
2.1 Income and Wealth Eﬀects of UI Beneﬁts
Unconstrained Case. Consider an individual for whom (2) does not bind at the optimum (µ =0 ).
An increase in b raises d for this individual through two channels. The ﬁrst is the reduction
in w − b, which creates an incentive to substitute toward leisure and raise d. This response to
distorted incentives is the moral hazard eﬀect of insurance provision. The second channel is the
wealth eﬀect: the wealth provided by an increase in b reduces λ. For unconstrained individuals,
the wealth eﬀect is negligible in practice. To see this, observe that the wealth eﬀect of the UI









Deﬁne δ = −
∂ logg
∂ logZ.L e t γW = −
∂ logλ
∂ logW denote the elasticity of the marginal utility of wealth
with respect to wealth, i.e. the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of the value function over wealth.
With this notation,
εW
d,b(µ =0 )=δγWεW,b (7)
5Despite the similarity in the equations, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the elasticity of duration w.r.t.
UI beneﬁts may diﬀer in magnitude. Job search and hours worked could respond diﬀerently to wage and beneﬁt
changes (Krueger and Meyer 2002).
8In the aggregate, UI is a balanced-budget transfer program, and induces no change in lifetime
wealth if behavior is unchanged. Higher beneﬁts are fully oﬀset by higher taxes. Hence, in
a benchmark case with identical agents and no behavioral responses, εW
d,b = εW,b =0 .I n a n
environment with heterogeneity, higher UI beneﬁts can generate increases in net wealth for some
individuals. To bound the magnitude of εW
d,b in this case, consider the eﬀect of an increase in UI
beneﬁts without any change in the UI tax. In this case, ∂W
∂b =1and εW,b equals the fraction
of lifetime wealth accounted for by UI beneﬁts. To obtain a rough estimate of this fraction, I
use data on weeks of unemployment from the PSID for household heads followed from 1968 to
1998. Among individuals who report being unemployed at least once, the median number of weeks
unemployed between 1968 and 1998 is 32.5 and the mean is 50. Since the wage replacement rate
for UI is typically 50% and males work for roughly 40 years in the U.S., UI beneﬁts account for
approximately 0.5×50
40×52 =1 .2% of lifetime wealth. This calculation likely overstates εW,b because
(1) it ignores non-labor income, (2) not all weeks of unemployment are covered by UI, and (3)
it ignores behavioral responses that lengthen unemployment durations and further reduce lifetime
wealth. Hence εW,b < 0.012, i.e. doubling UI beneﬁts permanently raises lifetime wealth by at
most 1.2% for the mean job loser.
The small impact of UI beneﬁts of lifetime wealth implies that UI has small wealth eﬀects on
unemployment durations for unconstrained agents. This can be established formally by bounding
the other parameters in equation (7). To bound δ,l e tεd,b denote the total elasticity of durations
with respect to beneﬁts, and recall that empirical studies of UI have found εd,b ∈ (0.4,0.8).D i f -




w−b, which implies δ = −
∂ logg
∂ logZ < 1 given that b
w ' 1
2
in practice. Given a plausible value for the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (e.g. γW < 5), it
follows that εW
d,b < 0.06. Hence, a 10% increase in UI beneﬁts raises duration by at most 0.6%
via the wealth eﬀect. The lifetime wealth eﬀect thus accounts for a minor fraction of εd,b for the
typical unconstrained UI claimant, even in the extreme case where higher beneﬁts are not oﬀset
at all by higher taxes.6 It follows that moral hazard induced by distorted incentives accounts for
6Of course, individuals who are laid oﬀ very frequently, such as seasonal workers, might experience a signiﬁcantly
larger wealth eﬀect from UI beneﬁt changes. Although these responses do not arise from the liquidity constraint
mechanism emphasized in this paper, they reinforce the general point that much of the UI-duration link could be due
to income or wealth eﬀects rather than substitution eﬀects.
9virtually all of the UI-duration link among unconstrained households.
Constrained Case. Now consider an individual for whom (2) binds, perhaps because he expe-
rienced shocks before period t that depleted his wealth or because he has a high discount rate and
did not build up a large buﬀer stock.7 An increase in b aﬀects d through two channels for this
agent as well. The ﬁrst is the substitution eﬀect, which again arises from the reduction in w − b.
The second channel is the income eﬀect: the liquidity provided by an increase in b reduces λ + µ
and ∆u. Using the Taylor approximation ∆u =( λ + µ)(ce − cu) and recalling that ce = w when











where γc = −
∂ logu0(cu)
∂ logcu denotes the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion over consumption and εcu,b is
the elasticity of consumption while unemployed with respect to beneﬁts. To gauge the magnitude
of εINC
d,b , ﬁrst observe that γc ≥ γW: since individuals can adjust labor supply and other margins
over their lifetime, the curvature of indirect utility over wealth must be lower than the curvature of







εW,b .E m p i r i c a l
studies of consumption-smoothing have found that εcu,b ≥ 0.2 among constrained groups. It
follows that the income elasticity of UI for constrained agents can be 10-20 times larger than the
corresponding wealth eﬀect for unconstrained agents. Thus, the income eﬀect could potentially be
as or more important than moral hazard in driving the UI-duration link among liquidity constrained
individuals.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. When an agent has insuﬃcient liquidity to
smooth consumption relative to permanent income, raising the unemployment beneﬁt level can
have a large eﬀect on consumption while unemployed. This reduces pressure to ﬁnd a job to
maintain consumption, creating the potential for a large income eﬀect. In contrast, when agents
are unconstrained, this channel is virtually shut down because UI beneﬁts are a trivial fraction of
7The important question of why many job losers have virtually no assets is left to future research. In this study,
I focus only on ex-post search behavior conditional on asset holdings, ignoring the reasons for initial asset choices.
10lifetime wealth and have little impact on consumption while unemployed.
The simplicity of this intuition indicates why this result holds in more general environments. UI
has an income eﬀect on durations for similar reasons in a search model with liquidity constraints.8
The result also holds with weaker assumptions about the nature of liquidity constraints. For
example, suppose agents are unconstrained when they lose their jobs, but are uncertain about their
unemployment durations and have a non-zero probability of hitting a borrowing constraint later
in the spell. Carroll (1997) shows that consumption while unemployed can be highly sensitive
to transitory income in such an environment because agents must be prepared for the possibility
of becoming constrained. Hence, UI can have a substantial income eﬀect for a broad group of
individuals with limited liquidity, and not just those facing a binding constraint.9
Irrespective of the modelling details, the key point is that the fraction of the UI-duration link
due to moral hazard is an empirical question when individuals have liquidity concerns. I provide
evidence on this issue in the next section.
3 Empirical Analysis I: The Role of Constraints
3.1 Estimation Strategy
The model suggests a natural ﬁrst step in evaluating whether liquidity constraints and income eﬀects
are empirically relevant in the UI-duration link: Estimate the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on durations
for constrained individuals (µ>0) and unconstrained individuals (µ =0 ) separately. If the UI-
d u r a t i o nl i n ki sd r i v e np r i m a r i l yb yt h eµ =0group, it would be implausible that income eﬀects
are important; but if the link comes from the µ>0 group, income eﬀects might matter.
I implement this heterogeneity analysis by replicating the identiﬁcation strategy of Moﬃtt
(1985) and Meyer (1990) on various subsets of the data. In particular, I divide individuals into
unconstrained and constrained groups and estimate equations of the following form using cross-state
8In a search model, reservation wages depend on the marginal utility of wealth and the level of unemployment
beneﬁts. The marginal utility of wealth becomes sensitive to the level of UI beneﬁts for constrained individuals,
creating an income eﬀect on durations.
9In view of this point, I refer to any household that has a positive probability of becoming liquidity constrained
while unemployed as “constrained” below.
11and time variation in UI beneﬁt levels:
logdit = β0 + β1 logb + β2Xi,t + θi,t (10)
where Xi,t denotes a set of covariates and θi,t denotes an idiosyncratic error. The key identifying
assumption is the same as that underlying the Moﬃtt and Meyer estimates — the UI beneﬁtr a t e
must be orthogonal to the error in the estimating equation:
Eb× θi,t =0 (11)
Some evidence supporting this assumption is described in the next section.
For simplicity, I ignore the small lifetime wealth eﬀect of a change in UI beneﬁts for uncon-
strained individuals by assuming εW
d,b(µ =0 )=0below. This assumption leads us to slightly
overstate the true magnitude of substitution eﬀects and understate the magnitude of income ef-









gives the pure substitution eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on durations for unconstrained individuals.








w h i c hi sa ne s t i m a t eo ft h et o t a le ﬀect of UI on durations for this group, including both substitution
and income eﬀects. Note that the composition of this elasticity in terms of the income and
substitution components cannot be directly identiﬁed with the empirical strategy implemented in
this section.
One might wonder why I focus on UI beneﬁts to test whether liquidity aﬀects unemployment
durations, rather than using other forms of variation in wealth holdings at the time of job loss.
T h em a i nr e a s o ni st h a tt h ev a r i a t i o ni nU Ib e n e ﬁts is credibly exogenous, insofar as it comes
12from diﬀerences across states and time in laws. In contrast, wealth holdings at the time of
unemployment are endogenous and correlated with other factors that could inﬂuence durations
such as skills. Indeed, Gruber (2001) ﬁnds that agents with low levels of wealth also tend to have
short job tenures and limited labor force experience, inducing a negative correlation between wealth
and duration.10
Deﬁning the constrained group. The main diﬃculty in implementing (10) is that µ is a latent
variable, making it impossible to classify households into groups directly based on whether they are
liquidity constrained. As shown by equation (9), an ideal deﬁnition of the constrained group would
be the set of households whose consumption while unemployed is sensitive to transitory UI beneﬁts.
Unfortunately, the SIPP data used below lack information on consumption. I therefore use several
proxies for being constrained that have been identiﬁed as predictors of liquidity constraints by
existing studies of consumption behavior.
The primary proxy is liquid wealth net of unsecured debt, which I term “net wealth.” Browning
and Crossley (2001) and Sullivan (2005) ﬁnd that households with no ﬁnancial assets prior to job
loss suﬀer consumption drops during unemployment that are mitigated by provision of UI beneﬁts.
In contrast, households with positive balances are able to smooth consumption and do not show
excess sensitivity of consumption to UI beneﬁts. This evidence suggests that households that
report positive net wealth prior to job loss are likely to have µ =0 , while the remainder of the
households are more likely to face a liquidity constraint while unemployed.11
The second proxy is whether the individual has a spouse who is also working prior to job loss.
Households that rely on a single income are more likely to be constrained when that individual
loses his job; those with a second income source may have additional sources of liquidity, including
better access to credit because at least one person is employed. The validity of this proxy is also
substantiated by the analysis of Browning and Crossley, who ﬁnd larger consumption drops and
higher sensitivity to UI among single-earner households. The third proxy for µ is an indicator
10This endogeneity problem could explain why Lentz (2003) and others generally ﬁnd little association between
wealth holdings and unemployment durations in the cross-section.
11As a robustness check, I also proxy for constraints using net liquid wealth divided by pre-unemployment wage.
This measure captures how much of the lost income each household can replace using its assets (Gruber, 2001).
Results with this alternative deﬁnition (not reported) are very similar.
13variable for whether the individual was making mortgage payments prior to job loss. Gruber
(1998) ﬁnds that fewer than 5% of the unemployed sell their homes during a spell, whereas renters
move much more frequently. Consequently, if an individual must make a mortgage payment, he
eﬀectively has less liquid wealth, and is more likely to be liquidity constrained than a renter.12
Though existing studies support the validity of these proxies for liquidity constraints, these
markers are obviously imperfect predictors of who is constrained. Some households with µ =0will
be misallocated to the µ>0 group and vice-versa. Such classiﬁcation error will pull the estimated
elasticities for the two groups closer together, thereby causing us to underestimate the importance
of liquidity constraints in the UI-duration link.
A concern in implementing (10) is that households may become constrained as an unemployment
spell elapses. This issue does not arise in the model in section 2 because it assumes that households
can anticipate their unemployment durations perfectly at the time of job loss. In practice, however,
households update their expectations over time while depleting their buﬀer stocks. As a result, the
probability that a household faces a binding constraint could rise as the spell elapses. Since asset
data are available only once for each household, the only feasible way to account for this possibility
is to estimate a model that permits a time-varying eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on unemployment exit rates
within the ex-ante constrained and unconstrained groups. This issue, and more importantly the
fact that many unemployment spells are censored in the data, motivates estimation of a hazard
model with time-varying covariates rather than estimation of (10) using OLS. Letting hi,s denote
the unemployment exit hazard rate for household i in week s of an unemployment spell and Xi,s
denote a set of controls, the primary estimating equation for the constraint tests is thus
hi,s = f(bi,s× bi,X i,s) (12)
12A potential concern with this proxy is that homeowners have more wealth than renters because of home equity.
However, Hurst and Staﬀord (2004) point out that since most job losers have low levels of home equity, they must
reﬁnance to access this wealth. Hurst and Staﬀord ﬁnd that while unemployment raises the probability of reﬁnancing,
approximately 2/3 of homeowners who lost their jobs between 1991 and 1996 in the PSID did not reﬁnance their
mortgages over that ﬁve year period, perhaps because reﬁnancing is a costly and slow process. This suggests that
many homeowners with mortgages may be more liquidity constrained than renters, at least in the short run, despite
having home equity wealth.
143.2 Data
The data used to estimate (12) are from the 1985-1987, 1990-1993, and 1996 panels of the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP collects information from a sample of
approximately 30,000 households every four months for a period of two to three years. The
interviews I use span the period from the beginning of 1985 to the middle of 2000. At each interview,
households are asked questions about their activities during the past four months, including weekly
labor force status. Unemployed individuals are asked whether they received unemployment beneﬁts
in each month. Other data about the demographic and economic characteristics of each household
member are also collected.
Im a k eﬁve exclusions on the original sample of job leavers to arrive at my core sample. First,
following previous studies of UI, I restrict attention to prime-age males (over 18 and under 65).
Second, I include only the set of individuals who report searching for a job at some point after
losing their job, in order to eliminate individuals who have dropped out of the labor force. Third, I
exclude individuals who report that they were on temporary layoﬀ at any point during their spells,
since they might not have been actively searching for a job.13 Fourth, I exclude individuals who
have less than three months work history within the survey because there is insuﬃcient information
to estimate pre-unemployment wages for this group. Finally, I focus primarily on individuals who
take up UI within one month after losing their job because it is unclear how UI should aﬀect hazards
for individuals who delay takeup. The potential sample selection bias related to UI takeup that
arises from this exclusion is addressed below.
These exclusions leave 4,560 individuals in the core sample. Note that asset data is generally
collected only once in each panel, so pre-unemployment asset data is available for approximately
half of these observations. The ﬁrst column of Table 1 gives summary statistics for the core
sample. Monetary values are in real 1990 dollars in this and all subsequent tables. The median
UI recipient is a high school graduate and has pre-UI gross annual earnings of $20,726. The most
13Katz and Meyer (1990) show that whether an individual considers himself to be on temporary layoﬀ is endogenous
to the duration of the spell; recall may be expected early in a spell but not after some time has elapsed since a layoﬀ.
Excluding temporary layoﬀs can therefore potentially bias the estimates. To check that this is not the case, I include
temporary layoﬀs in some speciﬁcations of the model.
15germane statistic for the present analysis is pre-unemployment wealth: median liquid wealth net
of unsecured debt is only $128.
The raw data on UI laws were obtained from the Employment and Training Administration
(various years), and supplemented with information directly from individual states.14 The com-
putation of weekly beneﬁt amounts deserves special mention. Measurement error and inadequate
information about pre-unemployment wages for many claimants make it diﬃcult to simulate the
potential UI beneﬁt level for each agent precisely. I therefore use three approaches to proxy for
each claimant’s (unobserved) actual UI beneﬁts, all of which yield similar results. First, I use
published average beneﬁts for each state/year pair in lieu of each individual’s actual UI beneﬁt
amount. Second, I proxy for the actual beneﬁt using maximum weekly beneﬁt amounts, which
are the primary source of variation in beneﬁt levels across states. Most states replace 50% of a
claimant’s wages up to a maximum beneﬁt level. The third method involves simulating each indi-
vidual’s weekly UI beneﬁt using a two-stage procedure. In the ﬁrst stage, I predict the claimant’s
pre-unemployment annual income using information on education, age, tenure, occupation, indus-
try, and other demographics. The prediction equation for pre-UI annual earnings is estimated on
the full sample of individuals who report a job loss at some point during the sample period.15 In
the second stage, I use the predicted wage as a proxy for the true wage, and assign the claimant
unemployment beneﬁts using the simulation program.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Graphical Evidence and Non-Parametric Tests
I begin by providing graphical evidence on the beneﬁt elasticity of unemployment durations in
constrained and unconstrained groups. I then show the robustness of these results to controls,
sample selection, and other potential speciﬁcation concerns. First consider the asset proxy for
14I am grateful to Julie Cullen and Jon Gruber for sharing their simulation programs, and to Suzanne Simonetta and
Loryn Lancaster in the Department of Labor for providing detailed information about state UI laws from 1984-2000.
15Since many individuals in the sample do not have a full year’s earning’s history before a job separation, I deﬁne
the annual income of these individuals by assuming that they earned the average wage they report before they began
participating in the SIPP. For example, individuals with one quarter of wage history are assumed to have an annual
income of four times that quarter’s income.
16constraints. I divide households into four quartiles based on their net liquid wealth. The median
level of net liquid wealth is close to zero, suggesting (based on the Browning and Crossley evidence)
that households in the lowest two quartiles are likely to be constrained, while those in the third
and fourth quartiles are not. Table 1a shows summary statistics for each of the four quartiles.
Households in the lower net liquid wealth quartiles are poorer and less educated, but the diﬀerences
between the four groups are not very large. Notably, quartiles 1 and 3 are similar in terms of income
and education. Hence, UI beneﬁts are similar both in levels and as a fraction of permanent income
for all the groups.
Figures 1a-d show the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on unemployment exit rates for households in the
each of the four quartiles of the net wealth distribution. To construct Figure 1a, I ﬁrst divide
the observations into two categories: Those that are in (state, year) pairs that have average weekly
beneﬁt amounts above the sample median and those below the median. Kaplan-Meier survival
curves are then plotted for these two groups using the households in the lowest quartile of the net
wealth distribution. This procedure is repeated for the other three quartiles of the net wealth
distribution to construct Figures 1b-d. Since ex-post asset levels may be endogenous to the
length of durations, households for whom asset data are available only after job loss are excluded
when constructing these ﬁgures. Including these households turns out to have little eﬀect on the
qualitative results, as we will see below in the regression analysis.
These and all subsequent survival curves plotted using the SIPP data are adjusted for the “seam
eﬀect” common in panel surveys. Individuals are interviewed at 4 month intervals in the SIPP and
tend to repeat answers about weekly job status in the past four months (the “reference period”). As
a result, they under-report transitions in labor force status within reference periods and overreport
transitions on the “seam” between reference periods. Consequently, a disproportionately large
number of spells appear to last for exactly 4 or 8 months in the data. These artiﬁcial spikes in the
hazard rate are smoothed out by ﬁrst ﬁtting a Cox model with a time-varying indicator variable for
being on a seam between interviews, and then recovering the (nonparametric) baseline hazards to
construct a seam-adjusted Kaplan-Meier curve. The resulting survival curves give the probability
of remaining unemployed after t weeks for an individual who never crosses an interview seam. The
results are qualitatively similar if the raw data is used without adjusting for the seam eﬀect.
17Figure 1a shows that higher UI beneﬁts are associated with much lower unemployment exit rates
for individuals in the lowest wealth quartile, who are most likely to be constrained (µ>0). For
example, 15 weeks after job loss, 55% of individuals in low-beneﬁt state/years are still unemployed,
compared with 68% of individuals in high-beneﬁt state/years. A nonparametric Wilcoxon test
rejects the null hypothesis that the two survival curves are identical with p<0.01.F i g u r e 1 b
constructs the same survival curves for the second wealth quartile. UI beneﬁts have a smaller, but
still powerful eﬀect on durations in this group. At 15 weeks, 63% of individuals in the low-beneﬁt
group are still unemployed, vs. 70% in the high beneﬁt group. The Wilcoxon test again rejects
equality of the survival curves in this group, with p =0 .04. Figures 1c and 1d show that eﬀect of
UI on durations virtually disappears in the third and fourth quartiles of the wealth distribution.
Not surprisingly, the Wilcoxon test does not reject equality of the survival curves in these two cases.
T h ef a c tt h a tU Ih a sl i t t l ee ﬀect on durations in the unconstrained groups suggests that it induces
little moral hazard among these households.16
I now replicate these graphs and nonparametric tests for the other two proxies of constraints.
Table 1b shows summary statistics for the constrained and unconstrained groups based on spousal
work and mortgage status. As with the asset cuts, there are diﬀerences across the constrained
and unconstrained groups in income and education, but these are not extremely large. Figures
2a-b compare the eﬀect of UI on unemployment exit rates for single and dual-earner households.
Figure 2a shows that UI beneﬁts signiﬁc a n t l yr e d u c ee x i tr a t e sf o rh o u s e h o l d sw h oa r em o r el i k e l y
to be constrained at the time of job loss because they were relying on a single source of income.
The Wilcoxon test rejects equality of the survival curves with p<0.01. In contrast, UI beneﬁts
appear to have no eﬀect on exit hazards for households with two earners (Figure 2b).
The results for the mortgage cut are similar. Figure 3a shows that UI beneﬁts have a sharp
eﬀect on durations among households that have a mortgage to pay oﬀ a tt h et i m eo fj o bl o s s ,a n d
equality of the two survival curves is again rejected with p<0.01. But among households without
a mortgage pre-unemployment, the diﬀerence between the survival curves in the high-beneﬁta n d
16The similarity of the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on hazard rates in the third and fourth quartiles is consistent with lthe
model. Once households have suﬃc i e n ta s s e t st oa v o i dh i t t i n gac o n s t r a i n t ,i n c o m ee ﬀects disappear, and further
i n c r e a s e si na s s e t ss h o u l dh a v en oi m p a c to nt h eU I - d u r a t i o nl i n k .
18low-beneﬁt groups is much smaller and statistically indistinguishable (Figure 3b). In contrast with
the two other proxies, the constrained types in this cut (homeowners with mortgages) have higher
income, education, and wealth than the unconstrained types, who are primarily renters (see Table
1b). This makes it somewhat less likely that the diﬀerences in the beneﬁt elasticity of duration
across constrained and unconstrained groups is spuriously driven by other diﬀerences across the
groups such as income or education.
An important assumption in this analysis is that the variation in UI beneﬁts is orthogonal
to unobservable determinants of durations, i.e. that (11) holds. To evaluate this identiﬁcation
assumption, Figure 4 shows the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on durations for a “control group” of below-
median net wealth individuals who do not receive UI beneﬁts, either because of ineligibility or
because they chose not to take up. The durations of these individuals are insensitive to the level of
beneﬁts, as are the durations of non-recipients who have net wealth levels above the median. The
results of these placebo tests support the claim that UI causes longer durations among constrained
UI recipients.17
3.3.2 Hazard Model Estimates
I evaluate the robustness of the graphical results by estimating (12) using a Cox speciﬁcation for
the hazard function. The Cox model assumes a proportional form for the hazard rate:
loghi,s = αs + β1 logbi + β2s × logbi + β3Xi,s (13)
where Xi,s denotes a set of covariates and {αs} are the set of baseline hazards.18 The coeﬃcient
of interest is β1, the elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to UI beneﬁts. To control for the
fact that the relationship between UI beneﬁts and the hazard rate may vary over time, the model
also includes an interaction of log(bi) with s, the weeks elapsed since job loss. Note that this
17Results are similar for the set of job losers who are ineligible for UI, who may be a better “control” because
takeup of UI is endogenous. However, the UI-ineligible group consists of workers who have very low levels of earned
income before unemployment and may diﬀer from the average UI claimant.
18The Cox model is more commonly speciﬁed as hi,s = α
0
s exp(β1 logbi +...), which is equivalent to (13). I use (13)
because it clariﬁes why the β1 coeﬃcient on log UI beneﬁts represents an elasticity.
19speciﬁcation does not impose any functional form on the baseline hazards, so the β1 coeﬃcient is
identiﬁed purely from variation in UI laws.
I ﬁrst estimate (13) on the full sample to identify the unconditional eﬀect of UI on the hazard
rate. In this speciﬁcation, as in most others, I use the average UI beneﬁt level in the individual’s
(state,year) pair to proxy for bi in light of the measurement-error issues discussed in the data section.
This speciﬁcation includes a full set of controls: industry, occupation, and year dummies; a 10 piece
log-linear spline for the claimant’s pre-unemployment wage; linear controls for total (illiquid+liquid)
wealth, age, education; and dummies for marital status, pre-unemployment spousal work status,
and being on the seam between interviews to adjust for the seam eﬀect. Standard errors in this
and all subsequent speciﬁcations are clustered by state.
The estimate in column 1 of Table 2a indicates that a 10% increase in the UI beneﬁtr a t e
reduces the hazard rate by 4% in the pooled sample. Reassuringly, this unconditional estimate is
in the range found by prior studies.
Heterogeneity by Net Liquid Wealth Quartiles. I now examine the heterogeneity of the UI eﬀect
by estimating separate coeﬃcients for constrained and unconstrained groups as in the graphical
analysis. Table 2 considers the asset proxy for constraints by dividing the data into four quartiles of
the net wealth distribution as in the graphical analysis. Let Qi,j denote an indicator variable that is
1 if agent i belongs to quartile j of the wealth distribution. Let αs,j denote the baseline exit hazard
for individuals in quartile j in week s of the unemployment spell. To reduce parametric restrictions,
the baseline hazards are allowed to vary arbitrarily across the constrained and unconstrained groups.
Columns 2-5 of Table 2 report estimates of {β
j
1}j=1,2,3,4 from the following stratiﬁed Cox model:
loghisj = αs,j + β
j
1Qi,j logbi + β
j
2Qi,j(s × logbi)+β3Xisj (14)
In this equation, β
j
1 corresponds to the elasticity of the hazard rate w.r.t. UI beneﬁts in quartile
j of the net wealth distribution. Speciﬁcation (2) of Table 2a reports estimates of (14) with
no controls (no X). The estimates indicate that β
j
1 is rising in j,i . e . t h ee ﬀect of UI beneﬁts
monotonically declines as one moves up in the net liquid wealth distribution.19 Among households
19The β
j
2 coeﬃcients on the time interactions are generally insigniﬁcant and do not exhibit any strong patterns in
20in the lowest quartile of net wealth, a 10% increase in UI beneﬁts reduces the hazard rate by 7.9%,
an estimate that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In contrast, there is a small, statistically
insigniﬁcant association between the level of UI beneﬁts and the hazard among households in the
third and fourth quartiles of net wealth. The null hypothesis that UI beneﬁts have the same eﬀect
on hazard rates in the ﬁrst and fourth quartiles is rejected with p<0.05,a si st h en u l lh y p o t h e s i s
that the mean UI eﬀect for below-median wealth households is the same as that for above-median
wealth households. These ﬁndings support the conclusion that UI beneﬁts have much stronger
eﬀects on durations for households constrained by low net liquid wealth.
Speciﬁcation (3) replicates (2) with the full set of controls used in column (1). The coeﬃcients
of interest are virtually unchanged when this rich set of covariates is introduced. The fact that
controlling for observed heterogeneity does not aﬀect the results suggests that the estimates are
unlikely to be very sensitive to unobservable heterogeneity as well.
The preceding speciﬁcations maximize sample size by using data on post-unemployment assets
for households where pre-unemployment asset data are unavailable. Speciﬁcation (4) addresses the
concern that post-unemployment asset levels are endogenous to durations by estimating (3) on the
subsample of households who have pre-unemployment asset data. Since the sample size is reduced
by more than 50%, the standard errors in this speciﬁcation are larger. However, the pattern of
the coeﬃcients remains very similar to that in speciﬁcation (3). The hypothesis that the eﬀect of
UI on exit rates of below-median wealth and above-median wealth households is the same can be
rejected with p =0 .05.
Speciﬁcation (5) introduces state ﬁxed eﬀects in addition to the full set of controls. In this
model, the variation in the UI beneﬁt level comes purely from within-state law changes. Results
remain similar, with monotonically increasing β
j
1 coeﬃcients as wealth rises.
Table 2b reports a series of additional robustness checks. All of these speciﬁcations include
the full control set. Column (1) shows that the estimates are similar when individuals with pre-
unemployment annual wages above $24,720, the 75th percentile of the wage distribution, are ex-
cluded from the sample. This speciﬁcation addresses the concern that UI may have a smaller
this and subsequent speciﬁcations. In the interest of space, these coeﬃcients are not presented in the tables.
21eﬀect in the high asset quartiles because it replaces a smaller fraction of income for high-income
households.
Columns (2) and (3) examine robustness to changes in the deﬁnition of bi. Column (2) uses the
maximum UI beneﬁt level in individual i’s state/year and column (3) uses the simulated beneﬁtf o r
each individual i using the two-stage procedure described above. Both speciﬁcations give similar
results to the baseline case. Column (4) shows that including individuals who report being on
temporary layoﬀ does not aﬀect the results.
Finally, column (5) replicates the baseline speciﬁcation but deﬁnes the quartiles of wealth in
terms of home equity rather than net liquid wealth and restricts the sample to homeowners. Home
equity is much less accessible than liquid wealth during an unemployment spell, since borrowing even
against secured assets is diﬃcult when one is unemployed (Hurst and Staﬀord 2004). If liquidity
constraints play a role in the UI-duration link, the diﬀerences in the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts across
quartiles of home equity should be weak compared to quartiles of net liquid wealth. Consistent
with this prediction, there is no systematic pattern in the coeﬃcients on the UI beneﬁtv a r i a b l e
across the quartiles in column 5.
As a robustness check, I predict assets based on age, income, education, and marital status. I
then deﬁne net liquid wealth quartiles on the basis of predicted wealth and replicate the preceding
analysis. Results from this procedure (not reported) are quite similar to those above. Individual
predictors of assets also support the results. For example, the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on durations is
much stronger among individuals younger than the median age (31 years) — who have fewer assets
on average — than among those above the median age.
Spousal Work Status. Table 3a reports estimates of speciﬁcations analogous to (14) for the
spousal work proxy. Instead of quartiles of liquid wealth, the UI beneﬁtc o e ﬃcient is interacted
with a dummy for whether the agent lived in a single-earner or dual-earner household prior to job
loss. The baseline hazards are also stratiﬁed by this dummy. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes
all observations in the core sample without any controls. In this group, there is a moderate but
statistically insigniﬁcant diﬀerence in the UI beneﬁtc o e ﬃcient for the single-earner and dual-earner
groups.
To explore this result in greater detail, observe that households with very low net wealth (who
22typically have substantial debt) are likely to be constrained irrespective of whether they have two
earners or not, and households with very high net wealth are likely to be unconstrained regardless of
spousal work status. Speciﬁcation (2) therefore focuses on households in the middle two quartiles of
the net wealth distribution, who are most likely to be on the margin of being liquidity constrained.
In this subgroup of households, the eﬀect of spousal work status emerges much more clearly. A
10% increase in the UI beneﬁt reduces the mean unemployment exit hazard by 5.5% for single-
earners but has a small, statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect for dual earners. The null hypothesis that
the eﬀect is identical in the two groups is rejected with p =0 .06. The third column shows that this
result is robust to including the full set of controls described above. The fourth column adds state
ﬁxed eﬀects, and shows that the general pattern is preserved although standard errors rise in this
speciﬁcation. Column 5 restricts attention to the households in the lowest quartile of net wealth.
Consistent with the hypothesis that these households are constrained regardless of spousal work
status, UI beneﬁts have a strong eﬀect on durations in both single-earner and dual-earner families
in this category.
Mortgage Status. Table 3b shows results for the mortgage proxy using the observations for
which pre-unemployment mortgage data is available. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation supports the graphical
evidence in Figure 3, indicating that UI beneﬁts have a much larger eﬀect on durations among house-
holds that have mortgages. Equality of coeﬃcients on the UI beneﬁt variable among mortgage-
holders and non-holders is rejected with p<0.01. The second and third speciﬁcations conﬁrm
that this result is robust to the full set of controls and state ﬁxed eﬀects. The fourth speciﬁcation
includes only households with net liquid wealth below the sample median. The estimates indicate
that low-wealth households who have to pay a mortgage — who are perhaps especially likely to face
a liquidity constraint — are extremely sensitive to unemployment beneﬁts in their search behavior.
Sample Selection Concerns. One might worry that endogeneity of takeup with respect to the
l e v e lo fb e n e ﬁts biases the estimate of the UI beneﬁt elasticity. In my sample, a 10% increase in
the beneﬁt rate is associated with a 1% increase in the probability of UI takeup in the ﬁrst month
of unemployment. If the marginal individuals who decide to take up UI when beneﬁts rise tend to
have shorter unemployment spells on average, estimates of the UI beneﬁt elasticity will be biased
toward zero.
23This issue is unlikely to aﬀect the results above for two reasons. First, the takeup elasticity is
similar across all the constrained and unconstrained subgroups. Hence, there is no reason that it
should artiﬁcially bias down the estimate only in the unconstrained group. Second, even if there
were diﬀerential biases across groups, the eﬀects on the estimated UI beneﬁt elasticity would be
quite small. The magnitude of the bias can be gauged by assuming that the individuals who are
added to the sample through this selection eﬀect are drawn randomly from the group who do not
takeup UI. The empirical hazards for the non-UI group are on average 1.1 times as large as those
of the UI recipients. In practice, the marginal individual who takes up UI is likely to anticipate a
longer UI spell than the average agent who does not take up UI, so the 1.1 ratio provides an upper
bound for the size of the selection bias. Starting from an initial takeup rate of 50%, a 10% increase
in beneﬁts will cause the average hazard rate to rise through this selection eﬀect by approximately
1%
50% ∗(1.1−1) = 0.2%.B u t t h e d i ﬀerence in the hazard rates across constrained and unconstrained
groups induced by a 10% beneﬁt increase was an order of magnitude larger (approximately 5%),
suggesting that this selection eﬀect is not critical.
Summary and Interpretation. T h eS I P Pd a t ae x h i b i tt w op a t t e r n s : ( 1 )U Ib e n e ﬁts induce
small substitution eﬀects among households likely to be unconstrained; and (2) UI beneﬁts cause
large duration increases among the constrained. This pattern is consistent with the existence of
income eﬀects. If one were to assume that substitution eﬀects are similar across unconstrained and
constrained groups, this evidence would be suﬃcient to infer that income eﬀects are substantial.
However, this assumption may be untenable: households with low liquidity might have diﬀerent
preferences that generate larger substitution eﬀects than unconstrained households.20 For this
reason, I avoid identiﬁcation of the income eﬀect based on such cross-group comparisons, and turn
to a second empirical strategy to investigate this issue.
20In Hurst’s (2004) terminology, households with low liquidity may be myopic “grasshoppers,” while unconstrained
households may be “ants” who plan ahead. Comparing grasshoppers with ants could be problematic.
244 Empirical Analysis II: Severance Pay and Durations
4.1 Estimation Strategy
The goal of this section is to decompose the eﬀect of beneﬁts on durations within the constrained
group into an income and substitution elasticity. The empirical strategy is based on the fact that
many ﬁrms in the United States make severance payments to employees they lay oﬀ. According to a
recent survey of Fortune 1000 ﬁrms (Lee Hecht Harrisson 2001), the most common policy for regular
(non-executive) full-time workers is a severance payment of one week of pay for each year of service
at the ﬁrm. However, some companies have ﬂatter or steeper severance pay proﬁles with respect to
job tenure. Many companies have minimum job tenure thresholds to be eligible for severance pay,
ranging from 3 to 5 years. For regular salaried employees, there is very little variation in severance
packages within a given ﬁrm and tenure bracket (presumably because individuals are reluctant to
negotiate with ﬁrms about severance pay). Hence, conditional on tenure, the primary source of
variation in severance pay comes from cross-ﬁrm diﬀerences in policies.
The key characteristic of severance payments for the present analysis is that they are lump-sum,
i.e. they are not proportional to the length of unemployment spells. Receipt of standard tenure-
based severance pay does not delay eligibility for UI beneﬁts. Severance payments therefore have
pure income eﬀects and do not distort marginal incentives for unemployed agents. I estimate the
income elasticity of unemployment durations using models similar to those above, changing the key
independent variable from the UI beneﬁtt os e v i, a dummy for receipt of severance pay:21
loghi,s = αsθ1sevi + θ2Xi,s (15)
The coeﬃcient θ1 reveals the causal eﬀect of lump sum grants on unemployment exit hazards if
receipt of severance pay is orthogonal to other determinants of durations. After estimating the
baseline model, tests of the key orthogonality condition are discussed.
21Unfortunately, the data on severance amounts is too sparse to be useful.
254.2 Data
The data for this portion of the study come from two surveys conducted by Mathematica on
behalf of the Department of Labor, matched with administrative data from state UI records. The
ﬁrst dataset is the “Study of Unemployment Insurance Exhaustees,” which contains data on the
unemployment durations of 3,907 individuals who claimed UI beneﬁts in 1998. This dataset
is a sample of unemployment durations in 25 states of the United States, with oversampling of
individuals who exhausted UI beneﬁts. In addition to administrative data on prior wages and
weeks of UI paid, there are a large set of survey variables that give information on demographic
characteristics, household income, job characteristics (tenure, occupation, industry), and most
importantly for this study, receipt of severance pay.
The second dataset is the “Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration.” This data
was collected as part of an experiment to evaluate the eﬀect of job reemployment bonuses on search
behavior. It contains information on 5,678 durations for a representative sample of job losers in
Pennsylvania in 1991. The information in the dataset is similar to that in the exhaustees study.
For comparability to the preceding results, I make the same exclusions after pooling the two
datasets to arrive at the ﬁnal sample used in the analysis.22 First, I include only prime-age males.
Second, I exclude temporary layoﬀs by discarding all individuals who expected a recall at the time
of layoﬀ, but check to make sure that including these observations do not change the results. These
exclusions leave 2,730 individuals in the sample, of whom 521 report receiving a severance payment
at job loss. Throughout the analysis, the data are reweighted using the sampling weights to obtain
estimates for a representative sample of job losers.
Two measures of “unemployment duration” are available in this data. The ﬁrst is the number
of weeks for which UI beneﬁts were paid in the base year. This deﬁnition has the advantage of
accuracy since it comes from administrative records. It also has two disadvantages: it is censored
a tt h et i m eo fb e n e ﬁt exhaustion, and it captures total weeks unemployed in a given year rather
than the length of a particular spell (which could be diﬀerent for individuals with multiple short
spells). The second measure is the survey measure, constructed from individual’s recollection
22Similar results are obtained within each of the two datasets when examined separately.
26(typically one-two years after the job loss event) of when they lost their initial job and when they
found a new one. I focus on the administrative measure here given its accuracy. However, results
are quite similar (with larger standard errors) for the survey measure.
Table 4 shows summary statistics for severance pay recipients and non-recipients. The sample
generally looks quite similar on observables to the SIPP sample used above. Given the minimum
tenure eligibility requirement, it is not surprising that severance pay recipients have much higher
median job tenures than non-recipients. Correspondingly, severance pay recipients are older and
higher in observable characteristics than non-recipients.
4.3 Results
I begin again with graphical evidence. Figure 5 shows Kaplan-Meier survival curves for two groups
of individuals: those who received severance pay and those who did not. Since pre-unemployment
job tenure is an important determinant of severance pay and is also highly positively correlated
with durations, I control for it throughout. These survival curves have been adjusted for tenure
by ﬁtting a cox model with tenure as the only regressor and recovering the baseline hazards for
each group. Severance pay recipients have signiﬁcantly lower unemployment exit rates. As a
result, 66% of individuals who received severance pay claimed more than 10 weeks of UI beneﬁts,
compared with 59% among those who received no severance payment. Equality of the two survival
curves is rejected by a nonparametric test with p<0.01.
An obvious concern with this result is that it may reﬂect correlation (via omitted variables)
rather than causality because severance pay recipients diﬀer from non-recipients in many respects.
As noted above, conditional on tenure, severance pay is determined primarily by ﬁrms and is
therefore unlikely to be correlated with individual-speciﬁc characteristics. Hence, any omitted-
variables explanation of the results must arise primarily from diﬀerences between ﬁrms that pay
severance and those that do not. A plausible alternative explanation of the result is that ﬁrms
that oﬀer severance packages require very speciﬁc skills, making it diﬃcult for job losers to ﬁnd
new jobs, leading to long durations.
I use two approaches to examine the causality of severance pay. First, I investigate whether the
27eﬀect of severance pay diﬀers across constrained and unconstrained groups. The model in section
2 indicates that severance pay — which is a minor fraction of lifetime wealth — should causally aﬀect
durations only among liquidity-constrained households. In contrast, there is no clear reason to
expect a diﬀerential eﬀect of severance pay across constrained and unconstrained households under
the alternative explanation described above. Hence, studying the heterogeneity of the severance
pay eﬀect provides a means of distinguishing between the causal and most natural omitted-variable
hypotheses.
Implementing this test requires division of households into constrained and unconstrained
groups. Unfortunately, the Mathematica surveys do not contain data on assets and the other
proxies for liquidity constraints used in the SIPP data. To overcome this problem, I predict assets
for each household with an equation estimated using OLS on the SIPP sample. The prediction
equation is a linear function of age, wage, education, and marital status. I then divide households
into two groups, above and below the median level of predicted assets. Recall that results based
on predicted assets (using exactly the same prediction equation) and actual reported assets were
very similar in the SIPP data: the total elasticity of duration w.r.t. UI beneﬁts is large among
households with predicted assets below the median, but near zero among households with pre-
dicted assets above the median. Hence, the predicted asset measure succeeds in identifying the
households whose search behavior is sensitive to UI beneﬁts.
Figures 6a-b replicate Figure 5 for the two groups. Figure 6a shows that receipt of severance
pay is associated with a large and statistically signiﬁcant increase in survival probabilities for
constrained (low asset) households. Figure 6b shows that severance pay has little eﬀect on search
behavior for households that are likely to be wealthier. As in the UI beneﬁt analysis, results are
similar if households are split into constrained and unconstrained groups on the basis of age or
income alone. Results are also unaﬀected by changes in the functional form of the asset prediction
equation, prediction via quantile regression instead of OLS, and trimming of outliers. The fact
that severance pay aﬀects durations only in the group of households that are sensitive to UI beneﬁts
(those who are likely to be constrained) supports the claim that income eﬀects drive much of the
28UI-duration link.23
As a second approach to examining the causality of severance pay, I assess the sensitivity of
the severance pay eﬀect to a rich set of controls. I estimate Cox hazard models ﬁrst with only
a linear tenure control and then with the following control set: ten piece linear splines for wages,
household income, job tenure; dummies for prior industry, occupation, race, state, and year; and
linear controls for age, marital status, education, and household size. The ﬁrst two columns of
Table 5 show that receipt of severance pay lowers the job-ﬁnding hazard rate by about 12% in
both the tenure-control and full-control speciﬁcations. Speciﬁcations (3) and (4) estimate sepa-
rate severance pay coeﬃcients for constrained (below-median predicted assets) and unconstrained
(above-median) households. Consistent with Figure 6, the estimates indicate that severance pay
has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on hazard rates only in the constrained group. Since controlling for ob-
served heterogeneity does not aﬀect the results, the estimates are not likely to be very sensitive to
unobservable heterogeneity either.
4.4 How Big is the Income Eﬀect?
The severance pay estimates can be combined with the total elasticity estimates from the SIPP
data to get a rough estimate how much of the UI-duration link is due to moral hazard vs. liquidity.
Note that the median severance payment in the sample is approximately equal to 5 weeks of wages,
which equals 10 weeks of UI beneﬁts. The median unemployment duration is also around 10
weeks. Hence, receipt of severance pay is roughly equivalent to doubling UI beneﬁts for the typical
individual.
The estimate from speciﬁcation 2 in Table 2 implies that a one log unit increase in the UI
beneﬁt reduces the hazard rate by 55% in the constrained groups (households below the median
in net liquid wealth). Analogously, the estimate from speciﬁcation 3 of Table 5 indicates that
receipt of severance pay reduces hazard rates by 38% for constrained households. Therefore,
23Severance pay recipients look better on observables than non-recipients within both the high predicted-asset and
low predicted-asset groups. This further supports the causal interpretation of the link between severance pay and
durations in the constrained group, given that similar diﬀerences in observables do not generate a correlation between
severance pay and durations among unconstrained households.
29roughly 38/55 = 70% of the UI-duration link is attributable to an income eﬀect for the constrained
groups. In the unconstrained groups, both income and substitution eﬀects appear negligible; the
null hypothesis that both eﬀects are zero cannot be rejected. If both elasticities are roughly zero
for the unconstrained groups, the income eﬀect still accounts for 70% of the total UI-duration
elasticity in the pooled sample of all households. While this calculation suggests that UI beneﬁts
raise durations primarily by providing liquidity rather than by distorting marginal incentives, the
70% ﬁgure should be interpreted cautiously because it involves a comparison of point estimates in
two diﬀerent samples. Further work is necessary to pin down the magnitude of the income eﬀect
precisely.
5N o r m a t i v e I m p l i c a t i o n s
I now discuss some normative implications of the results. Given the stylized nature of the model
analyzed here, these points should not be viewed as policy recommendations, but as a description
of some of the issues that should be considered in subsequent normative work.
1. Moral hazard cost of insurance. Following the substitution eﬀect interpretation of the
beneﬁt-duration link, a commonly held view is that policies which shorten unemployment durations
at the margin can raise social surplus signiﬁcantly by reducing the moral hazard problem. Examples
of policies that aim to correct marginal incentives include more stringent search requirements that
impose a cost on extending durations, provision of a job-ﬁnding bonus, or marginal reductions in
beneﬁts to induce shorter spells.
To quantify the moral hazard cost, consider a policy that reduces the proportional beneﬁtr a t e
b in order to reduce d. Suppose that the saved UI beneﬁts are returned as a lump-sum grant while
the agent is unemployed, so that cu does not fall. In Appendix A, I show that the marginal welfare




d,b is the substitution elasticity of the proportional beneﬁt on duration. Equation (16)
30shows that the eﬃciency gain from reducing the incentive distortion is proportional to εc
d,b,n o tt h e
total elasticity εd,b. Similar expressions can be obtained for the marginal welfare gain from raising
search costs or providing a job ﬁnding bonus when the accompanying taxes/subsidies are lump-
sum. Intuitively, if the proportional UI beneﬁta ﬀects search behavior only through an income
eﬀect, changing marginal incentives would leave search behavior and social surplus unchanged. But
if UI aﬀects search behavior through a substitution eﬀect, correcting marginal incentives without
reducing consumption while unemployed would bring d closer to the ﬁrst-best, raising welfare.
Hence, only the substitution eﬀect generates a moral hazard cost.
Using (16), the empirical evidence suggests that eﬀorts to shorten durations would yield eﬃ-
ciency gains 70% smaller than suggested by studies that attribute the entire duration response to
a substitution eﬀect. However, there are some important caveats to this point. First, this result
applies only to the duration margin. As emphasized by Feldstein (1978), Topel (1983), and others,
UI beneﬁts can distort other margins of behavior such as the incidence of layoﬀs. UI may generate
substantial deadweight burdens because of substitution eﬀects on such margins. Second, the results
apply only locally at the observed level of beneﬁts (approximately 40-50% of pre-unemployment
wages) in the U.S. If beneﬁts were closer to full wage replacement, substitution eﬀects could be-
come much more important. Hence, these results cannot be generalized beyond a moderate beneﬁt
level.
2. Optimal level and provision of UI. As one might expect, the smaller moral hazard cost
implies that the welfare-maximizing unemployment beneﬁt level is higher. Recent studies have
shown that the optimal beneﬁt rate is higher when the consumption-smoothing beneﬁt of UI is large
(Chetty 2006) and when the sensitivity of reservation wages to the beneﬁt level is high (Shimer
and Werning 2006). In Chetty’s formula, a large income eﬀect implies a higher optimal beneﬁt
level because εINC
d,b is proportional to the consumption-smoothing beneﬁto fU I( γεcu,b), as shown
in equation (9). In Shimer and Werning’s formula, generating a large income eﬀect would require
more “hand-to-mouth” consumers, raising the sensitivity of reservation wages to beneﬁts and again
driving up the optimal beneﬁt rate. Intuitively, the income elasticity estimate gives an additional
moment to be matched when calibrating a model as in Acemoglu and Shimer (2000). Matching
al a r g ei n c o m ee ﬀect would likely require tight liquidity constraints, which in turn yields a high
31optimal beneﬁt rate.24
While insuring unemployment may be beneﬁcial, government intervention is not necessarily the
best means of providing such insurance. Indeed, the empirical evidence in this paper suggests that
liquidity is a greater concern for unemployed agents than “insurance” in the classic sense of pooling
risk across households. Feldstein and Altman (1998) and Shimer and Werning (2005) point out that
grants or low-interest loans (e.g. via privately held UI accounts) are a better means of providing
liquidity than government transfers. In this sense, the results of this paper may ultimately favor
the use of private insurance or liquidity mechanisms.
3. Optimal path of UI beneﬁts. The provision of beneﬁts late in an unemployment spell is
valuable from an insurance perspective but has the drawback of magnifying incentive distortions
(see Karni 1999 for a survey). Insofar as substitution eﬀects are relatively small, an upward-sloping
beneﬁt path may be more desirable than previously thought. Calibrating models to match the
income and substitution elasticities estimated here could be a fruitful direction for further work in
this area.
4. Means-Testing. There is a controversial debate on whether temporary income assistance
programs should be means-tested, as in the United Kingdom. Browning and Crossley (2001) and
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2003) ﬁnd that UI does not smooth consumption for those who have high
levels of pre-unemployment assets, which points in favor of asset-testing. However, UI does not
appear to signiﬁcantly aﬀect unemployment durations for this group either. Since means-testing
can generate an additional eﬃciency cost by creating an incentive to save less, a universal beneﬁt
may maximize welfare.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes a new interpretation of the well known empirical relationship between unem-
ployment beneﬁts and durations. The existing view has been that individuals take longer to ﬁnd a
job when receiving higher UI beneﬁts because they perceive a lower private return to work (moral
24The income elasticity itself does not fully pin down the optimal beneﬁt rate because it only reveals the marginal
sensitivity of behavior to UI beneﬁts. To calculate the optimal beneﬁt rate, one must also determine how far current
behavior is from the ﬁrst-best, which introduces additional parameters into the welfare calculation.
32hazard). The evidence documented here suggests a more benign view of the UI-duration link:
unemployment durations rise mainly because households have more liquidity while unemployed,
reducing the pressure to ﬁnd work quickly.
It is important to reiterate that while the analysis of this paper suggests that the moral hazard
cost of UI is smaller than previously thought, it does not make clear recommendations regarding
government policy. In particular, we have not considered why the private sector cannot solve the
unemployment insurance problem. Indeed, the ﬁnding that duration responses to insurance are
primarily the consequence of liquidity rather than distorted incentives would apply equally well to
private unemployment insurance contracts, and may ultimately favor private-market approaches to
liquidity provision.
In future research, it would be interesting to identify the beneﬁts of extending unemployment
durations through the provision of liquidity. Does UI allow constrained individuals to ﬁnd better
job matches or does it facilitate additional consumption of leisure? Existing empirical studies
of this question have generally failed to detect an eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on wages, but conﬁdence
intervals are large because of the high degree of noise in wage data. There is some evidence,
however, that raising UI beneﬁts lowers subsequent job turnover rates (Centeno 2004). Future
work might be able to shed light on this issue by examining the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts
on wage and turnover rates for individuals with low liquidity in a large dataset.
Finally, while this paper has focused on unemployment, the main conceptual point applies
to a broad range of social and private insurance markets. For example, empirical studies have
documented large responses to health insurance, disability insurance, workers compensation, and
social security (see e.g. Krueger and Meyer 2002; Autor and Duggan 2003; Finkelstein 2005).
Identifying the fraction of these responses that is due to a substitution eﬀect could shed light on
the importance of moral hazard in these insurance markets.25
25Nyman’s (2003) recent theory of health insurance essentially proposes that income eﬀects account for the large
behavioral responses to health insurance documented in the empirical literature.
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35Appendix A: Eﬃciency cost of UI beneﬁts
Consider a UI system that consists of two parts: a lump-sum grant (severance payment) g and
a proportional beneﬁt b.B o t h b e n e ﬁts are ﬁnanced through a tax τ when the agent returns to
work. The UI provider maintains a balanced-budget, so
τ = bd + g
For an agent with µ>0, cu =
At+g
d + b and ce = w − τ
T−d. Indirect utility as a function of b
and g is









To compute the eﬃciency cost of lowering the proportional UI beneﬁt and raising the grant by an















Lowering b by $1 reduces income while unemployed by $d. The change in welfare from a $1














Using a Slutsky decomposition, the substitution eﬀect ∂dc
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36Appendix B: Measurement of unemployment durations in SIPP data
The measurement of unemployment durations in the SIPP diﬀers from conventional measures
because it requires the tabulation of responses to questions about employment at the weekly level.
This appendix describes the method used to compute durations, which follows Cullen and Gruber
(2000).
The SIPP reports the employment status of every individual over 15 years old for every week
that they are in the sample. Weekly employment status (ES) can take the following values:
1. With a job this week
2. With a job, absent without pay, no time on layoﬀ this week
3. With a job, absent without pay, spent time on layoﬀ this week
4. Looking for a job this week
5. Without a job, not looking for a job, not on layoﬀ
A job separation is deﬁned as a change in ES from 1 or 2 to 3, 4, or 5. The duration of
unemployment is computed by summing the number of consecutive weeks that ES >=3 ,s t a r t i n g
at the date of job separation and stopping when the individual ﬁnds a job that lasts for at least
one month (i.e. reports a string of four consecutive ES=1 or ES =2). Individuals are deﬁned as
being on temporary layoﬀ if they report ES = 3 at any point in the spell. They are included as
“searching” if they report ES = 4 at any point during their spell.
This method of computing durations results in a slightly diﬀerent mean duration than that
found in the CPS data. The mean spell in the SIPP lasts for 20.95 weeks before ending or
being censored, whereas the US Department of Labor reports a mean duration of approximately
15 weeks. The oﬃcial ﬁgure is computed from the length of ongoing spells for the cross-section of
unemployed individuals who report they are looking for work in the CPS. The oﬃcial deﬁnition
therefore excludes the spells of individuals who become discouraged and stop searching for work.
Unfortunately, these individuals cannot be identiﬁed in the SIPP because of the lack of reliable
information on search behavior. At a weekly frequency, reports of job search are frequently
interspersed with reports that the individual is not looking for a job; moreover, individuals often
ﬁnd jobs after reporting that they were not looking for one. Therefore, the only feasible measure
of the length of an unemployment spell is to count the weeks from job separation to either job
ﬁnding or censoring.
3712 3 4
Pooled (< -$1,115) (-$1,115-$128) ($128-$13,430) (>$13,430)
Median Liq. Wealth $1,763 $466 $0 $4,273 $53,009
Median Unsecured Debt $1,000 $5,659 $0 $353 $835
Median Home Equity $8,143 $2,510 $0 $11,584 $48,900
Median Annual Wage $17,780 $17,188 $14,374 $18,573 $23,866
Mean Years of Education 12.07 12.21 11.23 12.17 13.12
Mean Age 36.99 35.48 35.18 36.64 41.74
Fraction Renters 0.39 0.43 0.61 0.35 0.16
Fraction Married 0.61 0.64 0.59 0.60 0.63
No Yes No Yes
(0.63) (0.37) (0.55) (0.45)
Median Liq. Wealth $1,193 $3,001 $630 $4,855
Median Unsecured Debt $778 $1,357 $523 $1,725
Median Home Equity $3,838 $15,801 $0 $30,421
Median Annual Wage $16,472 $20,331 $15,946 $20,792
Mean Years of Education 11.84 12.46 11.88 12.53
Mean Age 35.33 39.79 35.96 38.66
Fraction Renters 0.44 0.30 0.71 0.00
Fraction Married 0.38 1.00 0.55 0.70
NOTE--Data source is 1985-87, 1990-93, and 1996 SIPP panels.  All monetary values are in real 1990 dollars.  
Sample includes prime-age males who (a) report searching for a job, (b) are not on temporary layoff, (c) take
up UI benefits within one month of layoff, and (d) have at least 3 months of work history in the dataset.
Sample size is 4,560 observations.   Liquid wealth is defined as total wealth minus all home equity, business equity,
and vehicle equity.  Net liquid wealth is liquid wealth minus unsecured debt.  Dual earner families are those where
spouse is working in month immediately preceding layoff.
Summary Statistics by Spousal Work and Mortgage Status in SIPP Sample
Dual Earner? Has Mortgage?
TABLE 1a
Summary Statistics by Wealth Quartile in SIPP Sample
Net Liquid Wealth Quartile
TABLE 1b(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled
Pre-wave State
Full cntrls No cntrls Full cntrls Full cntrls FE's
log UI ben -0.399
(0.197)
Q1 x log UI ben -0.794 -0.765 -0.756 -1.023
(0.300) (0.331) (0.626) (0.357)
Q2 x log UI ben -0.710 -0.547 -0.803 -0.829
(0.458) (0.406) (0.546) (0.412)
Q3 x log UI ben -0.165 -0.292 -0.287 -0.520
(0.301) (0.272) (0.386) (0.343)
Q4 x log UI ben 0.111 0.113 0.193 -0.081
(0.344) (0.288) (0.392) (0.402)
Q1=Q4 p-val 0.043 0.045 0.245 0.024
Q1+Q2=Q3+Q4 p-val 0.012 0.052 0.050 0.028
Observations 83834 81307 75739 35291 75739
NOTE-Coefficients reported are elasticities of hazard rate w.r.t. UI bens.  Standard errors clustered by state
in parentheses.  See note to Table 1 for sample definition.  Bottom two rows of table report p-values from
F-test for equality of coefficients across quartiles.  Specifications 2-5 include log UI ben interacted with asset 
quartile dummies as well as log UI ben interacted with weeks unemployed interacted with asset 
quartile dummies to capture time-varying effects of UI (see text for details).  Specs 3-5 include in addition
the following controls: Industry, occupation, and year dummies; a 10 piece log-linear 
spline for the claimant's pre-unemployment wage; linear controls for total (illiquid+liquid) wealth, age, 
education; and dummies for marital status, pre-unemployment spousal work status, and being on the seam
between interviews to adjust for the seam effect.  Spec 5 also includes state fixed effects.  
Spec 4 includes only households for whom asset data is available prior to job loss.  Spec 1 includes log UI
ben, log UI ben interacted with weeks unemployed, and full control set reported above.
In all specs, log UI ben is defined as average UI benefit in claimant's state/year pair.
In specs 2-5, baseline hazards are stratified by net liquid wealth quartile.
Number of observations equals total risk set (i.e., total number of unemployed weeks observed in the dataset).
TABLE 2a
Hazard Model Estimates by Quartile of Net Liquid Wealth
By Quartile of Net Liquid Wealth(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low-wage Maximum Actual Temp Home 
Full cntrls Benefits Benefits Layoffs Equity
Q1 x log UI ben -1.133 -0.765 -0.479 -0.754 -0.325
(0.342) (0.331) (0.177) (0.321) (0.628)
Q2 x log UI ben -0.763 -0.547 -0.542 -0.539 -0.143
(0.415) (0.406) (0.169) (0.382) (0.527)
Q3 x log UI ben -0.119 -0.292 -0.522 -0.238 -0.344
(0.255) (0.272) (0.145) (0.264) (0.616)
Q4 x log UI ben 0.211 0.113 0.048 0.145 -0.126
(0.483) (0.288) (0.282) (0.289) (0.411)
Q1=Q4 p-val 0.028 0.045 0.127 0.032 0.784
Q1+Q2=Q3+Q4 p-val 0.003 0.052 0.174 0.041 0.990
Observations 52805 75739 75739 80574 29549
NOTE-Coefficients reported are elasticities of hazard rate w.r.t. UI bens.  Standard errors clustered by state
in parentheses.  See note to Table 1 for sample definition.  Bottom two rows of table report p-values from
F-test for equality of coefficients across quartiles.  All specifications include log UI ben interacted with asset 
quartile dummies as well as log UI ben interacted with weeks unemployed interacted with asset 
quartile dummies to capture time-varying effects of UI (see text for details).  All specs also include
the following controls: Industry, occupation, and year dummies; a 10 piece log-linear 
spline for the claimant's pre-unemployment wage; linear controls for total (illiquid+liquid) wealth, age, 
education; and dummies for marital status, pre-unemployment spousal work status, and being on the seam
between interviews to adjust for the seam effect.  Spec 1. excludes households in the upper quartile
of the wage distribution.  Spec 2. proxies for UI ben using state/year maximums rather than averages.
Spec 3. uses individual-level simulated benefits based on wage histories.  Spec 4 includes temporary 
layoffs.  Spec 5. defines asset quartiles by home equity holdings instead of net liquid wealth
and includes only homeowners.  In all specs, baseline hazards are stratified by net liquid wealth quartile.
Number of observations equals total risk set (i.e., total number of unemployed weeks observed in the dataset).
Additional Hazard Model Estimates by Quartile of Net Liquid Wealth
TABLE 2b(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Middle Middle Middle
Full sample netliq Qs netliq Qs netliq Qs netliq Q=1
No cntrls No cntrls Full cntrls State FE's Full cntrls
-0.443 -0.550 -0.607 -0.969 -0.814
(0.267) (0.284) (0.259) (0.330) (0.446)
-0.308 0.109 0.138 -0.451 -0.730
(0.286) (0.457) (0.423) (0.363) (0.453)
0.590 0.057 0.070 0.217 0.901
84363 40905 36828 36828 19130
NOTE-Coefficients reported are elasticities of hazard rate w.r.t. UI bens.  Standard errors clustered by state
in parentheses.  See note to Table 1 for sample definition.  Bottom row of table reports p-values from
F-test for equality of coefficients across single and dual earners.  All specs include log UI ben interacted with dummies 
for spousal work as well as log UI ben interacted with weeks unemployed interacted with spousal work 
dummies to capture time-varying effects of UI (see text for details).  Specs 3-5 include in addition
the following controls: Industry, occupation, and year dummies; a 10 piece log-linear 
spline for the claimant's pre-unemployment wage; linear controls for total (illiquid+liquid) wealth, age, 
education; and dummies for marital status, and being on the seam
between interviews to adjust for the seam effect.  Spec 4 also includes state fixed effects.  
Spec 1 includes all observations; specs 2-4 only observations that lie between 25th and 75th percentile of net liquid
wealth distribution; spec 5 includes only observations below 25th percentile of net liquid wealth distribution.
In all specs, baseline hazards are stratified by spousal work status.
Number of observations equals total risk set (i.e., total number of unemployed weeks observed in the dataset).
TABLE 3a
Hazard Model Estimates by Spousal Work Status
Single earner x log UI ben
Dual earner x log UI ben
Single = Dual p-val
Observations(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Full sample Full sample netliq Q <=2
No cntrls Full cntrls State FE's Full cntrls
No mortgage x log UI ben 0.269 0.322 0.263 -0.135
(0.292) (0.218) (0.455) (0.390)
Mortgage x log UI ben -0.976 -0.938 -0.957 -1.552
(0.424) (0.419) (0.484) (0.667)
No mortg. = Mortg. p-val 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.047
Observations 37087 35291 35291 16656
NOTE-Coefficients reported are elasticities of hazard rate w.r.t. UI bens.  Standard errors clustered by state
in parentheses.  Sample consists of households in core sample for whom pre-unemp mortgage data is available.  
See note to Table 1 for definition of core sample.  Bottom row of table reports p-values from F-test for equality
of coefficients across non-mortgage and mortgage holders.  All specs include log UI ben interacted 
with mortgage dummies as well as log UI ben interacted with weeks unemployed interacted with mortgage 
dummies to capture time-varying effects of UI (see text for details).  Specs 2-4 include in addition
the following controls: Industry, occupation, and year dummies; a 10 piece log-linear 
spline for the claimant's pre-unemployment wage; linear controls for total (illiquid+liquid) wealth, age, 
education; and dummies for marital status, spousal work, and being on the seam
between interviews to adjust for the seam effect.  Spec 3 also includes state fixed effects.  
Specs 1-3 includes all observations; spec 4 only observations that lie below 50th percentile of net liquid
wealth distribution.  In all specs, baseline hazards are stratified by mortgage dummy.
Number of observations equals total risk set (i.e., total number of unemployed weeks observed in the dataset).
TABLE 3b
Hazard Model Estimates by Mortgage Holding StatusMedian pre-unemp job tenure (years) 1.9 1.6 4.8
Median pre-unemp annual wage $20,828 $19,183 $29,874
Percent dropouts 14% 16% 6%
Percent college grads 17% 13% 34%
Percent married 58% 56% 68%
Mean age 36.4 35.5 40.6
Mean number of persons in hhold 2.21 2.24 2.04
NOTE--Data source is Study of Unemployment Insurance Exhaustees and Pennsylvania Reemployment 
Bonus Demonstration (Mathematica surveys matched to administrative UI records).  These datasets are 
publicly available through the Upjohn Institute.  All monetary values are in real 1990 dollars.  
Sample includes prime-age male UI claimants who are not on temporary layoff.
Sample size is 2,730 observations.  Data is reweighted using sampling probabilities to yield estimates for a
representative sample of job losers.  Pre-unemp job tenure is defined as number of years spent working at 
firm from which worker was laid off.
(0.82) (0.18)
TABLE 4
Summary Statistics for Mathematica Sample
Pooled No Severance Severance(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tenure Control Full Controls Tenure Control Full Controls
Severance Pay Dummy -0.115 -0.127
(0.030) (0.035)
(Netliq < Median) x Sev Pay -0.476 -0.445
(0.084) (0.093)
(Netliq > Median) x Sev Pay 0.068 0.058
(0.058) (0.060)
Equality of coeffs p-val <0.001 <0.001
Observations 2730 2426 2561 2426
NOTE-Coefficients reported are elasticities of hazard rate w.r.t. UI bens.  Standard errors clustered by
state in parentheses.  See note to Table 4 for sample definition.  Bottom row of specs 3 and 4 reports
p-values from an F-test for equality of coefficients across low and high-asset groups.  Columns 1 and 3
include only a linear control for tenure at pre-job loss employer in addition to reported coefficients.  
Columns 2 and 4 include the following controls: ten piece linear splines for wages, household income, 
job tenure; dummies for prior industry, occupation, race, state, and year; linear controls for age, marital 
status, education, and household size.  Baseline hazards in specs 3-4 are stratified by Netliq < Median.
Netliq < Median is an indicator variable for whether the household's predicted assets 
(using an equation estimated from the SIPP data; see text) are below the sample
median. Netliq > Median is defined analogously.
TABLE 5
Effect of Severance Pay on Hazard Rates




























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Lowest Quartile of Net Wealth
Figure 1a
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.01
Mean UI benefit = $185





























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Second Quartile of Net Wealth
Figure 1b
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.04
NOTE–Sample for both figures consists of observations in the core SIPP sample for which
pre-unemployment wealth data are available. See Table 1 for definition of core sample and definition
of net liquid wealth. Figure 1a includes households in lowest quartile of real net liquid wealth. Figure
1b includes those in second quartile. Each figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival curves for two groups of
individuals: Those in state/year pairs with average weekly benefit amounts (WBA) below the sample
mean and those in state/year pairs with WBAs above the mean. Survival curves are adjusted for seam




























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Third Quartile of Net Wealth
Figure 1c





























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Highest Quartile of Net Wealth
Figure 1d
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.43
NOTE–These figures are constructed in the same way as Figures 1a-b using observations in the third




























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Single-Earner Households
Figure 2a





























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Dual-Earner Households
Figure 2b
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.37
NOTE–Figure 2a includes households in the core SIPP sample with one earner in the month prior to
job loss. Figure 2b includes households with two earners. See Table 1 for definition of core sample.
Each figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival curves for two groups of individuals: Those in state/year pairs
with average weekly benefit amounts (WBA) below the sample mean and those in state/year pairs with
WBAs above the mean. Survival curves are adjusted for seam effect by fitting a Cox model and




























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Households with Mortgages
Figure 3a





























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Households without Mortgages
Figure 3b
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.31
NOTE–These figures are constructed in the same way as Figures 2a-b. Figure 3a includes households
who make mortgage payments; 3b includes all others. Only observations with mortgage data prior to




























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Placebo Test: Effect of UI Benefits on Low-Wealth Non-Recipients
Figure 4
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.53
NOTE–The sample for this figure consists of prime-age male job losers in the SIPP data who (a) do not
report receiving UI benefits while unemployed, (b) report searching for a job, (c) are not on temporary
layoff, (d) have at least 3 months of wage history prior to job loss, and (e) have below-median net liquid
wealth prior to job loss. Kaplan-Meier survival curves are plotted for two groups of individuals: Those in
state/year pairs with average weekly benefit amounts (WBA) below the sample mean and those in
state/year pairs with WBAs above the mean. Survival curves are adjusted for seam effect by fitting a


























0 5 10 15 20 25
Weeks Unemployed
Received Severance Pay No Severance Pay
Effect of Severance Pay on Durations
Figure 5
Wilcox Test for Equality: p = 0.00
NOTE–Data are from Mathematica surveys matched to administrative UI records. See note to Table 4
for additional details on data and sample definition. Data is reweighted using sampling probabilities to
yield estimates for a representative sample of job losers. Kaplan-Meier survival curves are plotted for
two groups of individuals: Those who received a severance payment at the time of job loss and those
who did not. Survival curves are adjusted for the effect of pre-unemployment job tenure on durations by
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Weeks Unemployed
Received Severance Pay No Severance Pay
Effect of Severance Pay on Durations: Below Median Net Wealth
Figure 6a





























0 5 10 15 20 25
Weeks Unemployed
Received Severance Pay No Severance Pay
Effect of Severance Pay on Durations: Above Median Net Wealth
Figure 6b
Wilcox Test for Equality: p = 0.52
NOTE–See Figure 5 for sample definition. Each of these figures is constructed in exactly the same
way as Figure 5. Figure 6a includes observations where predicted net wealth is below the sample
median; Figure 6b includes those above the median. Net wealth is predicted using a linear function of
age, wage, education, and marital status that is estimated on the core SIPP sample as described in
text.